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SISTER UNION STRIKES AND "NO STRIKE"
CLAUSES: THE LOGIC AND NECESSITY
OF A PRESUMPTION OF INCLUSIVITY
INTRODUCTION
With the reinstitution of limited injunctive relief in the labor-
management field, the Supreme Court left unanswered numerous
correlative problems. The Boys Markets' decision, despite its self-
limiting, narrow application, 2 has been used in these ensuing years
to justify a plethora of injunctive remedies, notwithstanding either
the Norris-LaGuardia Act limitations3 or the stormy interaction
of forces that beckoned Norris-LaGuardia in the first place.4 The
emergence of judicial uncertainty, coupled with the growing trend
toward preference of arbitration, has left Boys Markets the bul-
wark of strike-prevention efforts. From the management side Boys
Markets represents a judicial enforcement of the collective bargain-
ing quid pro quo,5 yet from the labor side Boys Markets must be
interpreted as remaining true to its limited holding.6
Overshadowing the entire problem is the unique relationship of
these bargaining-table adversaries. For while their relationship is
basically symbiotic, their short-term goals are sharply divergent:
each, quite naturally, wants a larger slice of the economic pie. The
1. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
2. "Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not under-
mine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only with the
situation in which a collective bargaining contract contains a mandatory
grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure." Id. at 253.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 101 provides that:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this
chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or per-
manent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared
in this chapter.
4. See, F. FRANKFURTER AND N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1 (2d
ed. rev. 1963; orig. ed. 1930) (hereinafter cited as FRANFURTER AND
GREENE).
5. See text at note 55, infra.
6. Supra note 2.
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vehicle is collective bargaining; the method is subtle, and some-
times not-so-subtle coercion.
Tranquil economic relationships achieved in great part through
collective bargaining, can exist only when each side is assured of
receiving those benefits and considerations for which they bar-
gained.7 If an issue is left ambiguous, or is "resolved" ambigu-
ously, the potential for conflicting interpretations in the future cre-
ates the potential for economic strife. The necessity of coercive
steps often results in the emergence of ill will between the parties
and a viewing of the collective bargaining process with skepticism.
One thought predominates: ambiguities and potential difficulties
must be dealt with at the bargaining table so that rights and obli-
gations are clearly understood. The absence of foresight, or the
reluctance of the adversaries, has often prevented an orderly han-
dling of labor grievances through thorough collective bargaining
sessions. While ambiguities still exist, Boys Markets remains the
ace-in-the-hole for anti-strike injunctive efforts on the part of man-
agement.
8
One problem area is the sister union strike. Although com-
pletely lawful under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,9 this labor instru-
ment of solidarity now stands as the next concept to be absorbed
into the injunctive premise of Boys Markets. This analysis will
attempt to lay the foundation for a theoretical examination of the
Boys Markets holding vis-a-vis sister union strikes. This will be
done in light of the difficultes whch still exist in its interpreta-
tion, and in light of labor relations history. As the pendulum of
labor relations seemingly swings back towards management and
employer-oriented protections,'0 the roles of collective bargaining
7. See generally, A. SLOANE AND F. WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS (2d ed.
1972) (hereinafter cited as SLOANE ANI WTYNEY).
8. This article will attempt to show that the Boys Markets' holding
is, and should represent a broad interpretative theory of inclusivity, going
initially to the benefit of management. Some authors, correctly, are warn-
ing management negotiators to be specific, and to not rely on mere trends.
See, e.g., Dinkel, The Enforcement of No-Strike Clauses, 9 LAw NOTES 107
(1973). This article, too, urges all negotiators to spell out their demands
at the bargaining table. It in no way counsels its readers to rely on man-
agement-oriented decisions necessarily emanating from collective bargain-
ing ambiguities.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 113.
10. For another example of the management-oriented trend see, Adler,
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agents similarly shift. It is at the point now where labor unions
may have to specifically reserve a right thought to be statutorily
granted, or be faced with losing that right.
THE PROBLM
A sister union strike is not a new problem to management. It
has the potential of occurring in the private sector any time two
distinct bargaining units work side by side. If bargaining unit A
calls a strike of its members for some lawful reason and bargaining
unit B, under the same management, decides to honor A's strike,
B is engaging in a sister union strike. The result of this action
is a more widespread, rather than a partial work stoppage. Absent
other facts, both unions are acting within their lawful statutory
rights.1
The problem becomes more legally complex if we add the fact
that bargaining unit B is under a collective bargaing agreement
containing a "no-strike" clause,12 while bargaining unit A is not.13
Before discussing the various theoretical approaches to this pro-
blem it would be wise to examine the unique legal background
of this issue.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1932, with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the labor
movement in this country finally received the statutory support
it needed to achieve parity with management. The anti-injunction
provisions legalized economic sanctions by labor unions,1 4 and gave
Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: The Chameleons Are Coming, 24
LAB. L.J. 131 (1973).
11. Supra note 3; 29 U.S.C. § 113.
12. "The incorporation of a no-strike clause in a labor agreement means
that all disputes relating to the interpretation and the application of a labor
agreement are to be resolved through the grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure in an orderly and peaceful manner, and not through the harsh arbi-
ter of industrial warfare. The pledge of the union not to strike during
the contract period stabilizes industrial relations within the plant and
thereby protects the interests of the employer, the union, and the employ-
ees. Indeed, a chief advantage that employers obtain from the collective
bargaining process is the assurance that the plant will operate free from
strikes or other forms of interruption to production (slowdowns, for ex-
ample) during the contract period." SLOANES AND WrhsEY, supra note 7,
at 389.
13. The difference between never having had a "no-strike" agreement,
or having had such an agreement recently terminate is not of significance
in this analysis.
14. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involv-
ing or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
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teeth to the economic, and sometimes social demands of their offi-
cials.15 As long as the labor sanction involved or grew out of a
labor dispute16 no injunction could be issued.17
With this giant step towards equalization, labor groups and man-
agement began entering into meaningful collective bargaining
agreements. 8 Many of these contained "mandatory arbitration-
no strike" clauses.' 9 The legislative efforts toward economic tran-
quility and stabilization were looked upon favorably by the judicial
system,2 0 yet not without some skepticism. 2 ' Judicial opinion came
forth most notably in the Steelworkers trilogy.22 In this series
of cases, the Supreme Court examined the collective bargaining
concept and set forth several guidelines.
In Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co. the Court said:
"Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as a vehicle
for handling any and all disputes that arise under the agree-
participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein de-
fined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in
any relation of employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved
in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling,
or by any other method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in pro-
motion of their interests in a labor dispute;
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without
fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified ... " 47 Stat. 70,
29 U.S.C. § 104.
15. See, M.D. FoRKOscH, A TaATISE ON LABOR LAW, Chapters IV and
XIII (2d ed. 1965).
16. Supra note 3.
17. The classic treatment of the labor injunction is to be found in
FIRKAmRTER Am GREENE, supra note 4.
18. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454,
531 (1957).
19. Supra note 12.
20. Supra note 18.
21. The giving up of the right to strike must be expressed in "clear
and unmistakable language." Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325
F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963).
22. United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S
593 (1960).
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ment.'' 23 In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
the collective bargaining agreement was held to contain "the rights
and duties of the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a gener-
alized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen can-
not wholly anticipate. 2 4 Also,
[A] rbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by mold-
ing a system of private law for all the problems which may arise
and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally
accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties.
25
Inevitably, the collision occurred. The anti-injunction provisions
and the strong historical policies of Norris-LaGuardia26 were struck
head-on by the heretofore impotent concept of mandatory arbitra-
tion. The first time the Supreme Court was asked to comment,
they espoused no judicial precedent for bilateral mandatory arbi-
tration.
In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson27 the Supreme Court chose
to uphold only the employer's half of mandatory arbitration's quid
pro quo.28 The employer had to arbitrate grievances but the union
could not be enjoined from striking.29 The first round went to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. What remains baffling from this hold-
ing and its history is the fact that employers continued to nego-
tiate collective bargaining contracts with one-side-enforceable "no-
strike" clauses.8 0 Perhaps, clairvoyantly, stare decisis did not ring
23. 363 U.S. at 567.
24. 363 U.S. at 578.
25. 363 U.S. at 581.
26. FRANxFURTER ANDm GREENE, supra note 4.
27. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
28. See Relias, The Developing Law Under Boys Markets, 23 LAB. L.J.
758 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Relias).
29. "Since we hold that present case does grow out of a 'labor dispute',
the injunction sought here runs squarely counter to the proscription of in-
junctions against strikes contained in § 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
to the proscription of injunctions against peaceful picketing contained in
§ 4(e) and to the proscription of injunctions prohibiting the advising of
such activities contained in § 4(i). For these reasons, the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, deprives the courts of the United States of jurisdiction to
enter that injunction unless, as is contended here, the scope of that Act
has been so narrowed by the subsequent enactment of § 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act that it no longer prohibits even the injunctions specifically
described in § 4 where such injunctions are sought as a remedy for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement. Upon consideration, we cannot agree
with that view and agree instead with the view expressed by the courts
below and supported by the Court of Appeals for the First and Second
Circuits that § 301 was not intended to have any such partially repealing
effect upon such a long-standing, carefully thought out and highly signifi-
cant part of this country's labor legislation as the Norris-LaGuardia Act."
370 U.S. at 203.
30. One possible explanation was the existence of concurrent state laws
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convincingly when measured against this bargained-for quid pro
quo and the traditional concept of contractual obligations freely
entered into.3
1
Parity, though, was forthcoming. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770 the Supreme Court recognized a different
priority, and chose to establish an exception to the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The facts in Boys Markets
were deceptively simple. Over a dispute as to the responsibility
of arranging merchandise in a frozen food case, the union struck.
Management, pursuant to the express terms of their present con-
tract, demanded arbitration and the immediate cessation of the
strike. The union refused; management obtained a temporary re-
straining order. The union challenged on the strength of the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act and on the relatively recent Supreme Court
opinion in Sinclair.
2
The Supreme Court, in upholding the sanctity of the "no-strike"
clause, overruled Sinclair and paved the way for the issuance of
the first post-Norris-LaGuardia Act labor injunction.33 Boys Mar-
which permitted the issuance of injunctions when the state had jurisdic-
tion. See Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, And The Presumption
of Arbitrability, 85 HIv. L. REv. 636, 647-48 n.50 (1972).
31. The court will sometimes look into the bargaining history of the par-
ties to see if the clause had been proposed and rejected, never proposed,
etc. See, Montana-Dakota Utility Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir.
1972).
32. "At the outset, we are met with respondent's contention that Sinclair
ought not to be disturbed because the decision turned on a question of
statutory construction which Congress can alter at any time. Since Con-
gress has not modified our conclusions in Sinclair, even though it has been
urged to do so, respondent argues that principles of stare decisis should
govern the present case." 398 U.S. at 240.
33. "We do not agree that the doctrine of stare decisis bars a re-exam-
ination of Sinclair in the circumstances of this case. We fully recognize
that important policy considerations militate in favor of continuity and
predictability in the law. Nevertheless, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
for the Court, '[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and question-
able, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more
embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119.. . . It is precisely because Sinclair
stands as a significant departure from our otherwise consistent emphasis
upon the congressional policy to promote the peaceful settlement of labor
disputes through arbitration and our efforts to accommodate and harmo-
nize this policy with those underlying the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act that we believe Sinclair should be reconsidered. Fur-
1049
kets, however, was not to be a sweeping departure from prior poli-
cies. As a precedent it became applicable when:
1) The parties to the injunction action are bound by a collective
bargaining agreement that contains a mandatory grievance
and arbitration clause.
2) The strike or concerted activity sought to be enjoined arises
out of a dispute subject to the grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure.
3) The employer was ready to proceed with arbitration when the
employees went out on strike.
4) The issuance of an injunction would be appropriate under the
ordinary principles of equity, that is, the employer would suf-
fer irreparable injury if the strike would not be enjoined.34
THEORETICAL ANALYsis
Boys Markets has given us the framework with which to ex-
amine employer-sought injunctions in labor disputes. By keeping
in mind the legal-historical background of sister union strikes, the
usefulness of Boys Markets as a precedent can be ascertained. Two
major areas will be discussed below.
The Enumerated Contract Provision
The judicial system has been consistent in refusing to grant an
injunction when the collective bargaining agreement reserves a
particular right to strike to the union.85 In Morton Salt Co. v.
NLRB,3 0 for example, the "no-strike" clause expressly reserved the
individual employees' right to honor other unions' lawful picket
lines.37 The 9th Circuit stated that although the reservation was
not determinative of the issue3 8 it did reflect the parties' intent
that disputes of this kind do not arise under the grievance proce-
dure found elsewhere in the contract.
Other courts have been stronger in their enforcement of specific
strike reservations. In Martin Hageland, Inc. v. U.S. District Court,
thermore, in light of developments subsequent to Sinclair, in particular
our decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), it has
become clear that the Sinclair decision does not further but rather frus-
trates realization of an important goal of our national labor policy." 398
U.S. at 240-41.
34. Relias, supra note 28, at 759.
35. "The national labor policy as explained in Boys Markets, does not
justify-indeed it prohibits-the entry of the preliminary injunction to pre-
vent the union from asserting a right to strike which it specifically re-
served by contract." Associated General Contractors of Illinois v. Illinois
Conference of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1972).
36. 472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972).
37. 472 F.2d at 421.
38. Id.
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Central District of California09 a 9th Circuit court contended that
it was without jurisdiction to order the union to forego the remedy
it reserved at the bargaining table.40 Another interpretation
yielded a similar result in Standard Food Products Corporation v.
Brandenberg.41 Here, the Second Circuit firmly upheld a union's
retention of the right to strike when enumerated employer viola-
tions occurred and the union could present a "colorable claim" of
such violations.
42
One pitfall of the above precedents is the language used to create
the right to honor a sister union's picket line. Where, for example,
the retention of the right is predicated on the existence of a "bona
fide" dispute by the sister union with the employer, the absence
of proof of "bona fides" will remove the exception to the "no
strike" provision and permit the injunction to issue.43
An enumerated clause can work the other way as well. A union
can agree to a clause that will prohibit it from honoring a sister
union's lawful picket line.44 When such is the case, a union may
not call, authorize, or comfort a strike, and may not remain silent
in the face of a wildcat strike by its members. The duty contrac-
tually imposed on the union is to undertake every reasonable
means available to return the strikers to work.4 5
All things considered, the courts will use the enumerated con-
tract clause to gather the intent of the parties. They are hesitant
to reverse obligations freely entered into, especially if these are
shown to directly relate to obligations assumed and carried out
by the other side. An unambiguously worded, distinct clause in
the collective bargaining agreement retaining (or yielding) the
right to honor another union's lawful picket line will create that
39. 460 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1972).
40. 460 F.2d at 791.
41. 436 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1970).
42. 436 F.2d at 966.
43. Harrington & Co., Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Association,
Subordinate Local No. 1416, 356 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
44. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association, International,
442 F.2d 251, 255 (8th Cir. 1971).
45. The union has a contractual obligation to the employer "to deplete,
if necessary, its arsenal of all available means to halt the strike." Eazor
Express, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp. 158,
169 (W.D. Pa. 1973); accord, Adley Express Co., et al v. Highway Truck
Drivers and Helpers Local 107, 365 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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obligation. Specific reservations, however, are often not enumer-
ated by the parties. This necessitates further discussion of the
problem in a different, more complex context.
The Scope of the General "No Strike" Clause
Any discussion here must begin with the concepts of "arbitrabil-
ity" and "waiver". In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav-
igation Co., the Supreme Court stated that all doubts arising from
collective bargaining agreements are to be resolved in favor of
arbitration.40  Therefore, it would seem that a dispute which may
or may not be within the scope of the agreement is to be consid-
ered included, and thus enjoined until arbitration has taken place.47
Numerous cases have proceeded under this broad construction of
the waiver of the right to strike.
48
Arguments, as well as precedents, however, exist on the opposite
side of this problem. One major precedent emanates from the
Warrior & Gulf case cited above.49 This narrower interpretation
of arbitrability recognizes the strong federal policy of promoting
peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration yet
chooses to hold Boys Markets to its narrowest interpretation.50
With specific regard to sister strikes, two strong arguments can
sometimes be successfully made for the narrow interpretation of
a general "no strike" clause. The first argument is that the em-
ployer-employee friction is a result of a strike, not the cause of
the strike, and thus is not a dispute resolvable under the parties'
collective bargaining agreement.51 The second argument is based
on the inappropriateness of classifying a sister union strike as one
"over a grievance" which the parties were contractually bound to
arbitrate.
2
It would appear that there exists sufficient lower federal court
support for either the broad (inclusive) or the narrow (exclusive)
interpretation of the "no strike" clause vis-a-vis sister strikes. The
46. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960).
47. 363 U.S. at 582.
48. See, e.g., Kable Printing Co. v. District Lodge 101, International As-
sociation of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 359 F. Supp. 265 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
49. 363 U.S. at 582-83.
50. Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local
Union No. 6869, 362 F. Supp. 1073, 1081-83, (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
51. General Cable Corp. v. I.B.E.W., Local Union No. 1644, 331 F. Supp.
478 (E.D. Md. 1971).
52. Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
of North America, AFL-CIO, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir. 1972).
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key, perhaps, lies with the wording of the particular arbitration
clause. 53 With specific emphasis on the problem addressed in this
article,
.. . the right to strike is protected by law, whether it be for eco-
nomic reasons, for the purpose of improving working conditions,
or for mutual aid or protection of employees who are members
of another Union. This right may be surrendered or waived by
appropriate provisions in the collective bargaining agreement.54
(emphasis added)
While the bargaining parties are given almost an infinite number
of ways to approach the problem of the inclusivity-exclusivity of
the "no strike" clause, the courts are given but two. They, in any
individual case, may mandate a broad construction and interpret
the waiver to cover every applicable instance not specifically and
precisely excluded, or, they may interpret the clause as narrowly
drawn and require that all inclusions be specifically enumerated.
Despite the balancing of judicial precedents, the pendulum of labor
relations has been moving towards a broader interpretive stance
with regard to inclusivity and arbitrability. Likewise with regard
to the ease with which the courts have been finding broad waivers
of the right to strike. The burden is being placed on the union
to negotiate their exceptions to the general "no strike" clause, thus
allowing management to walk to the bargaining table with greater
flexibility and power in their negotiating position.
Three considerations will now follow. Each will examine the
judicial soundness of an interpretation of inclusivity and arbitra-
bility of a sister strike engaged in by a union under a general
"no strike" collective bargaining agreement. The three are: 1) the
quid pro quo argument; 2) the equity argument; and 3) the labor
policy argument.
1. The Quid Pro Quo Argument
Boys Markets stated that ". .. a no-strike obligation, express
or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer
to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration."5 5 The
decision solidified the Court's preference for an inclusive interpre-
53. Monogahela Power Company v. Local No. 2332 International Broth-
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir. 1973).
54. Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 523 (6th Cir. 1972).
55. 398 U.S. at 248.
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tation. In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,
an earlier Supreme Court had stated:
... the agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not
merely those that a court may deem to be meritorious. There is
no exception in the "no strike" clause and none therefore should
be read into the grievance clause, since one is the quid pro quo
for the other.50
In the above interpretation the Court adopts a rule of "equality
of obligations". Maintenance of contractual balance is of the ut-
most concern. This prevents the bargaining concept from becom-
ing fruitless to one side or the other, with arbitration necessarily
abandoned as a vehicle for mutual peaceful resolution of disputes.
Neither side should be willing to assume obligations unless con-
comitant obligations are undertaken by the other side. 57  Here,
the employer is made to arbitrate and the union is made to stay
on the job.
But Boys Markets, apart from its own limited holding, spoke of
generalities. Precise case-by-case analysis is dictated by the court's
obligation to fairly construe the terms of the contract. 58 In Boys
Markets there existed no exceptions to the union's obligation to
remain on the job. Where the wording is clear and unambiguous,
and the agreement prohibits any strike or activity interfering with
the employer's production, a broad construction is not only to be
preferred, but would seem to be demanded by the Boys Markets
precedent.
As to sister union strikes, if the union has unqualifiedly prom-
ised not to interfere with employer's production for the life of the
agreement, the union is bound not to honor the other union's picket
line. This can be the only result if the quid pro quo rationale
is to co-exist with the federal policy of promoting arbitration and
peaceful settlement of disputes.59
2. The General Principles of Equity Argument
This consideration brings several equitable concepts into direct
conflict with one another. It is for this reason that the sister union
strike question often skirts a direct confrontation with equity.
56. 363 U.S. at 567.
57. 398 U.S. at 252.
58. Affiliated Food Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 229, 483 F.2d
418, 419, 420 (3d Cir. 1973).
59. The union still may specifically reserve the right to participate in
a sister union strike. When they do not, however, it is important to focus
on the concept of "equality of obligations" and the employer's potential
reliance on continuous job performance by the union members for the life
of the contract.
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In arguing for an injunction, the employer invokes the concepts
of "inadequacy of the remedy at law", "irreparable injury", "oc-
curring and continuous breaches", and "balancing of hardships".
Often on the facts the court will be judicially compelled to rec-
ognize these principles both to issue and to uphold labor injunc-
tions.60
Yet in dealing with sister strikes, the reality is that equitable
arguments by management have been successful only when cou-
pled with public policy arguments. For example, in Ozark Air
Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association International6 ' the pilots
of Ozark refused to cross a picket line of a sister union in spite
of the existence of a "no strike" clause in their current collective
bargaining agreement. The court in Ozark focused on the lack of
reasonable efforts on the part of the union to negotiate the dis-
pute.62 The court then went on to note the inadequacy of the
remedy at law and the irreparable injury to be sustained if service
was interrupted on an interstate carrier.63
In another instance, equity was linked to public policy to pre-
vent employees from striking over wages. The collective bargain-
ing agreement permitted strikes only to counter "clear violations"
of the contract in Allied Division of the Delaware Contractors As-
sociation, Inc. v. Local Unions 542, 542A, 542B, I.U.O.E.64 The court
in Allied held that the wage dispute was not a "clear violation"
of the agreement, thus it was subject to the arbitration clause. The
court went on to find "irreparable injury" resulting from the
termination of construction work on several projects of public im-
portance.6 5
Labor unions would seemingly have more success in invoking
equitable concepts alone, based on the unique circumstances of a
sister union strike. In a situation close in basic theory to the sister
strike, one solid equitable argument prevented the issuance of an
injunction. In Lanco Coal Co. v. Southern Labor Union, Local No.
60. Holland Construction Co. v. International Union of Operating En-
gineers, Local Union No. 101, 315 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1970).
61. 361 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Miss. 1973).
62. 361 F. Supp. at 201-02.
63. 361 F. Supp. at 202.
64. 351 F. Supp. 568 (D. Del. 1972).
65. 351 F. Supp. at 571.
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25000 the dispute involved a question of representation. As with
the sister strike, there was no work assignment issue, and the
strikers had no direct grievance against the struck employer. The
court stated:
One traditional consideration in the use of equity powers is the
avoidance of multiple litigation. The doctrine that equity does not
deal in "halves" is also of significance. In the instant case the
issuance of this injunction will not necessarily eliminate other dis-
putes but may indeed produce a fragmentation of remedies.
67
The injunction was denied.
Unions, though, have also found themselves on the receiving end
of the injunction-denial. In Automobile Transport, etc. v. Paddock
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.08 the union honored a lawful picket line
of a sister union in accordance with an express reservation in their
collective bargaining contract.69 When the strike was over the
union members reported back for work but only two were allowed
to return based on seniority. The union sought to arbitrate their
grievance and sought a mandatory injunction. The court held that
principles of equity did not warrant the issuance of an injunction
in this case.
70
Regardless of the positions of the parties, equity reduces to an
examination of the individual facts. Yet, two general hypotheses
can be drawn about equity and sister union strikes. First, if Union
A has already struck the employer and caused a work stoppage
or disruption, it is much less likely that the sister strike by Union
B would cause "irreparable injury" to the employer. Second, if
Union A has already struck the employer, the seeking of an injunc-
tion against Union B's sister strike would not resolve the original
dispute. The injunction proceeding itself might be considered
"multiple litigation" of the type that equity seeks to prevent, and
certainly will not assist.
Thus, from an equitable view, a presumption of inclusivity might
seem to work an injustice on the labor union, but this is not so.
Principles of equity would neither warrant nor demand a broad
interpretation of the "no strike" clause. If either of the above
hypotheses (no additional injury, or non-resolution of the original
dispute) are found to exist, equity might demand the non-issuance
66. 320 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
67. 320 F. Supp. at 275.
68. 365 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
69. 365 F. Supp. at 602.
70. The court considered the concepts of occurring and continuous
breaches, irreparable injury, and the balancing of hardships. 365 F. Supp.
at 602.
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of the injunction. And this, in fact, is what would occur notwith-
standing the broad scope of the Boys Markets precedent, and not-
withstanding a presumption of inclusivity. The injunction would
not issue because the equitable arguments by the union would re-
move the necessary element of the injunction being appropriate
under ordinary principles of equity spelled out by the Supreme
Court in Boys Markets. With this precedent removed, the appli-
cable law becomes the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and with it the
strong statutory protections against injunctions.
Thus, labor's equitable strengths are in no way adversely affected
by a presumption of inclusivity under Boys Markets. Under either
interpretative analysis, the side that clearly carries the equitable
issues will prevail. Equity neither depends upon presumptions,
nor convincingly argues against presumptions. The ultimate fair-
ness of a presumption of inclusivity must rely on other considera-
tions when equity provides no definitive resolution to the sister
strike under a general "no strike" provision.
3. The Thrust of Labor Policy
As in all labor-management situations, a certain deference must
be paid to public policy. The Supreme Court found policy reasons
to substantiate the Boys Markets decision, just as they did earlier
with their opposite holding in Sinclair. In remarking on the re-
turn of the strike injunction the Court stated:
[T]he central purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to foster the
growth and viability of labor organizations is hardly retarded-
if anything, this goal is advanced-by a remedial device that
merely enforces the obligation that the union freely undertook un-
der a specifically enforceable agreement to submit disputes to ar-
bitration.71
This third consideration deals with the most amorphous aspect
of the arguments surrounding presumptions of inclusivity. If Boys
Markets is viewed strictly as an attempt to establish industrial har-
mony and stability, it is easy to understand the benefits and detri-
ments apportioned to each side by permitting injunctions. Unions
are prevented from striking to aid sister unions, and such a pre-
vention serves to dilute the strength of the labor movement. Yet
in permitting injunctions, arbitration is promoted, as well as peace-
fl settlements of disputes without employee loss of wages.
71. 398 U.S. at 252-53.
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For management, the permitting of injunctions guarantees the
absence of work stoppages for the Boys Markets scope is broad,
especially when extended to cover wildcat strikes and, as shown
here, sister strikes. Yet, the fostering of industrial harmony and
stability by compelling the employer to use the arbitration process
removes some of the employer's options of responsivity in dealing
with problems arising out of the management operation and the
work milieu.
As with equitable considerations, the individual facts will be
strongly determinative, but, again, two hypotheses will be put
forth. First, if Union A's strike has already disrupted normal in-
dustry operations, the sister strike by Union B must be measured
only by the increased disruption to the industry, not by the total
industrial disruption. With wide-spread chaos, and the absence of
industrial harmony, the policy considerations of Boys Markets fall
to the wayside and do not at all contribute to justifying manage-
ment's injunctive efforts.
The second hypotheses is related to the first. If the sister strike
serves to confuse and render more difficult the retention of indus-
trial harmony, labor policy would dictate the issuance of an injunc-
tion, provided the other necessary criteria were met. Such a sit-
uation might arise where the sister union's strike confuses or blurs
the issues underlying the initial strike and compounds the prob-
lem of resolving those issues. Here the Boys Markets precedent
is useful as a statement of labor policy for the 1970's as it promotes
the need for clarity and compromise between labor and manage-
ment.
It remains arguable whether this final consideration contributes
at all to the broad interpretation of the "no strike" clause. On
the other hand, the amorphous quality alluded to earlier severely
prevents this consideration from substantially aiding labor's at-
tempt to rebut a presumption of inclusivity.
SUMMARY OF CONSMERATIONS
With sister union strikes the balancing of considerations must
be precise-both conceptually and factually. No doubt, there are
easy, convenient rationalizations on both sides. To uphold an in-
junction the party contends a violation of the "no-strike" clause,
points to Boys Markets, claims irreparable injury to the employer,
and uses language consonant with a broad constructionist view-
point. To defeat the injunction, the party contends that the under-
lying dispute is not about the contract, points to the self-limiting
application of Boys Markets, and in its strict-constructionist words
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clings to the policy rationale of Norris-LaGuardia. The easy ju-
dicial decision though will not resolve the larger question. This
concerns the scope of the broad "no-strike" provision, the burden
of proof of inclusivity or exclusivity, and the unique equitable con-
siderations of each case.
The initial consideration by the court must be whether or not
the issue of sister strikes has been dealt with in the present collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the parties. The enumerated
clause, as evincing the intent of the parties, will prevail as part
of the explicit quid pro quo.
The absence of an enumerated provision summons the need for
a theoretical analysis of the "inclusivity-exclusivity" concept. Boys
Markets, despite its self-professed limited holding, has been thrust
by lower federal courts into a position where it is used to justify
anti-strike injunctions arising in many varied contexts. One such
context is the sister strike.
This broadening, however, is not necessarily bad, nor necessarily
unwarranted from an analysis of the problem areas of quid pro
quo, equity, and public policy. Under the quid pro quo analysis
the presumption of inclusivity, in a broadly drawn "no strike-
mandatory arbitration" agreement, is warranted by the Supreme
Court's stance on promotion of arbitration as the preferred means
for the settlement of labor disputes. Under the equity analysis,
the Boys Markets criterion of irreparable injury makes any pre-
sumptions of inclusivity-exclusivity superfluous. Equitable consid-
erations thus do not warrant any deviation from the presumption
dictated by the quid pro quo analysis. The public policy analysis
comes forth as too nebulous, alone, to dictate a deviation from the
presumption of inclusivity. When linked, however, to equitable
issues, the argument over the non-applicability of Boys Markets
as a precedent would immediately surface. This argument suffices
to defeat the presumption if equitable considerations clearly would
permit the strike.
It remains, therefore, that no judicial considerations stand in the
way of allowing the courts to interpret Boys Markets in its broad-
est sense. In a "no strike-mandatory arbitration" agreement the
presumption ought to be that sister union strikes are prohibited,
unless the right to so honor them is specifically reserved. The
law, equity, and public policy are supportive of this position.
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CONCLUSION
The case of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770
has left in its wake unanswered questions. Perhaps the most un-
answerable is how far the decision itself will be used to justify
anti-strike injunctions. Yet the more pertinent question is how
collective bargaining negotiators will react to this shifting of bar-
gaining strength between labor and management.
Boys Markets, interpreted with a presumption of inclusivity,
would be an extremely important decision as both sides struggle for
increased economic benefits amidst, hopefully, tranquil relations.
Any purported anti-labor effects of such a presumption can be
more than compensated for at the bargaining table. Herein lies
the importance of the decision, and the importance of a presump-
tion of inclusivity. The resolution of areas of ambiguity will ulti-
mately benefit both management and labor for it will compel them
either to accept the legal guidelines or to establish their own. No
longer will each side allow the issue (e.g. the sister union strike)
to go unmentioned during negotiations on the assumption that
silence will go to their benefit. The parties will walk in knowing
that if the right is not specifically reserved, Boys Markets, and
a myriad of following precedents will consider the right to be
waived within the general "no strike" promise.
It is only in this way that the bargaining parties are made to
determine for themselves the rights and obligations apportioned
under the agreement. The "advantage" given to management by
this presumption of inclusivity of sister union strikes will last only
until the present collective bargaining agreement expires. This is
indeed a small price to pay for certainty under the law. For,
to offer no guidelines in the face of omission, and to leave the
ambiguity to the judicial system, is tantamount to a renunciation
and rejection of the collective bargaining process.
JOHN S. ADnm
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